The efficiency of direct payments versus tax reductions under uncertainty by Goetz, Renan-Ulrich et al.
The Efficiency of Direct Payments versus Tax
Reductions under Uncertainty∗
Renan-Ulrich Goetz†, Alois Keusch‡, and Joan Ribas Tur §
June 2003
Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of farmers in the presence of
direct payments and uncertainty. In an empirical analysis for Switzerland, it
confirms previously obtained theoretical results and determines the magnitude
of the theoretical predicted effects. The results show that direct payments in-
crease agricultural production between 3.7% to 4.8%. Alternatively to direct
payments, the production effect of tax reductions is evaluated in order to de-
termine its magnitude. The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical
results of the literature and demonstrates that tax reductions are also dis-
torting, but to a substantially lesser degree if losses are not offset. However,
tax reductions, independently whether losses are offset or not, lead to higher
government spending than pure direct payments.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural policy reforms such as the Agenda 2000 in Europe or the U.S. Farm Act
1996 promoted direct payments, either as green direct payments or as compensatory
payments as a means of income support for farmers. Previous income support for
farmers was based on price supports for different commodities, but was found to be
inefficient and not adequate for responding to the challenges agriculture will face in
the next millennium.
The OECD (1995) distinguishes between ”pure” direct payments and ”less eco-
nomically distorting direct payments”, commonly referred to as decoupled or coupled
direct payments, respectively. The former category is unrelated to past and future
levels of output and factors of production as well as present levels and free of any
conditions or constraint on recipients. The latter category includes measures that
imposes conditions on recipients or may be linked to inputs, output or income lev-
els, providing they are nearly neutral with respect to current and future production
levels. Decoupled payments under environmental or regional assistance programs,
or for income support, are classified as green box measures by the WTO Agreement
within the Uruguay Round (WTO, 2000). Green box measures however, need not to
be included in the calculation of the Total Aggregate Measurement Support (Total
AMS), and are exempt from the agreed reduction of 20%. As such they have a
specific appeal to policy makers.
The majority of direct income measures, implemented in the OCED member
countries fall in the category of coupled direct payments in order to stabilize and/or
to provide income. As such, they have a distorting effect on production. However,
the literature also identifies problems with decoupled direct payments in the context
of a stochastic environment. Sandmo (1971), and Pope and Just (1991) showed that
decoupled direct payments, having a pure wealth effect, will not alter production
decision if preferences are CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion). If direct
payments were stochastically independent from farm profits (the profits exclusively
obtained from farming), direct payments would induce a pure wealth effect and
consequently lead to a change in production decisions for preferences other than
CARA. Production would rise with an increase in pure wealth if preferences were
DARA (Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion) or it would decrease with an increase
in pure wealth if preferences were IARA (Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion). For a
stochastic environment, however, decoupled support often does not present a pure
wealth effect because the farm profits and the magnitude of direct payments are
stochastically dependent, e.g. by the weather or the market price. For this case,
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Hennessy (1998) establishes sufficient conditions, where an increase or decrease in
decoupled direct payments increases or decreases production respectively.
This paper provides an empirical application of the theory of the farmer’s be-
havior under uncertainty in the presence of decoupled green direct payments in
exchange for the provision of environmental public goods, or the production of pos-
itive externalities. We compare our results, obtained for the case of Switzerland, to
the results of an empirical analysis for Iowa conducted by Hennessy (1998). This
paper extends Hennessy’s previous work to the case where market price and crop
yields are correlated, i.e. the case of a locally traded good or a small country with
no free trade. Additionally, the Swiss direct green payment scheme as it is currently
in place presents the additional element of income support and income stabilization
at the same time.
Finally, and most importantly, we analyze the effect of tax reductions on farm
profits in exchange for the provision of environmental public goods, or the production
of positive externalities. In contrary to the case of certainty where tax reductions
do not affect the optimal level of output, Sandmo (1971) showed that this result
does not hold in the case of uncertainty. However, the presented analytical results,
obtained for the special case of full loss offset do show to which extent a tax reduction
distorts the optimal output level. To answer this question an empirical analysis is
proposed. Moreover, this empirical analysis allows to compare the distorting impact
of direct payments and tax reductions. In this way it may guide policy makers to
define policies with the least distorting impact.
2 Direct Payments
Hennessy (1998) has shown that even decoupled direct payments alter production
decisions in the context of a stochastic environment. To quantify the magnitude of
this distortion, we analyze the effect of decoupled direct payments as they are paid
in Switzerland according to the Swiss Farm Bill 2000, Article 31b. As an example
we consider the case of wheat, where farmers receive direct payments provided that
they follow certain guidelines for its production. Moreover, the price of wheat is
guaranteed up to a certain level of the national production. Once the national pro-
duction exceeds this amount the target price is not supported anymore, and farmers
face a negatively sloped, but still government supported, demand curve. Thus, the
government provides income support and income stabilization. Additionally, our
statistical analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between the individual
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crop yields at the farm level and the nationally produced amount of wheat. Thus,
the farmer’s crop yield is not independent of the market price, due to a government
price scheme that is based on the amount of the nationally produced wheat. This
setting captures the case of locally traded goods or the case of a small country with
no free trade with the rest of the world.
2.1 Empirical Analysis
The Swiss agricultural classification schemes for agricultural production distinguishes
between 6 different zones. Our empirical analysis represents a farm located in a re-
gion classified as a valley zone. Based on a typical wheat production function for this
region (Walter, 1994) and the cultivation techniques and fertilization rates proposed
by the extension services, we estimated the mean wheat yield per hectare at the farm
level, µF , and the cost function, C(x), where x denotes wheat yields. Based on a
risk analysis for the Swiss wheat production by Regev, Gotsch and Rieder (1997) we
calculated the standard deviation of the wheat yields at farm level, σF that corre-
sponds to the previously determined µF . Additionally, we estimated the mean and
the standard deviation the nationally produced wheat yields per hectare, denoted
by µCH and σCH respectively, based on data collected by the SBS (1970-1999). The
results of our estimation are presented in Table 1.
Farm Level National Level
Mean crop yield µF = 56.98 dt/ha µCH = 59.03 dt/ha
Std. dev. of crop yield σF = ± 9.04 dt/ha σCH = 4.736 dt/ha
Cost Function C(x) = 2378 + 2.2852 · exp(0.00786)x —
Table 1: The Production Environment
Moreover, we estimated the changes in σF as a result of a change in µF . Based
on the risk analysis by Regev, Gotsch and Rieder (1997), we obtained the following
results presented in Table 2.
µF 34.531 41.432 46.069 50.299 54.528 58.758 62.871 67.216 68.516 69.716 70.445
σF 7.513 7.827 8.079 8.617 9.203 10.066 11.046 12.698 13.573 14.380 15.544
Table 2: Changes in σF as a result of a change in µF in dt/ha
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The government supported demand function q for wheat for the years 1995 and
1996 was calculated based on data supplied by the SBS (1970-1999), which provides
the inverse demand function expressed in terms of one hectare: 1
p(q) =

151.322−q
1.285
, q > 39dt
87.4105, q ≤ 39dt.
Farm profits per hectare pi(x) can be calculated by pi(x) = p(q)x− C(x), where
q and x are both stochastic. It is assumed that x and q are normally distributed
with parameters (µF , σF ) and (µCH , σCH) respectively.
2 However x and q are not
independent. Their linear dependency, expressed as the correlation coefficient r, was
estimated based on the central evaluation of the accounting data for Swiss farms
(FAT, 1987-1996). The value was found to be 0.63. Hence, they were modelled as a
bivariate normal distribution taking into account the value of r. 3
The employed utility function is quite flexible and allows us to accommodate
CARA and DARA preferences4. For brevity of exposition, however, we limit our
discussion to the case of DARA preferences since they are widely supported by the
empirical literature (Binswanger, 1981; and Chavas and Holt, 1990).
The utility function is given by
U(pi) = − exp(−γ1pi) + γ2pi,
for γ1, γ2 > 0, and all pi (Lin and Chang, 1978), and its coefficient of absolute risk
aversion by
ρ(pi) =
γ21 exp(−γ1pi)
γ1 exp(−γ1pi) + γ2 .
The parameters of the utility function are calibrated with the help of θ(pi), the
risk premium at farm profit level pi. The risk premium denotes the fraction of the
1The analysis does not incorporate years previous to 1995, since there were changes in the
government support programme.
2Our data did not provide evidence of non-symmetry so that the assumption of a normal
distribution seems appropriate.
3In order to obtain the desired linear dependency between the stochastic variables x and q, they
were generated according to x = σF z1 + µF and y = a1z1 + a2z2 + µCH , where a1 = 0.63σCH ,
a2 =
√
σ2CH − (a1)2 and z1, z2 are normal distributed variables with mean 0 and standard deviation
1.
4More flexible utility specification, such as the expo-power function of Saha (1993), have been
developed, however, it is often not quite clear how the choice of the parameter values relate to risk
aversion attributes (Henessy, (1998)).
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standard deviation of an equiprobable two-point gamble that a risk-averse person
would be willing to pay to avoid the gamble. Thus, we obtain:
θ(pi) =
E(pi)− U−1 [1
2
U(pi + σpi) +
1
2
U(pi − σpi)
]
σpi
, (1)
where the two point gamble is in terms of ±σpi. To compare our result to those of
Hennessy we also choose θ(0) = 0.5 and θ(E(pi)) = 0.25. Utilizing the two values
of θ(·) equation (1) can be solved for the values of U−1[·] - the certainty equivalents
CE1 and CE2. Thus the following i equations, i = 1, 2 have to hold:
1
2
U(pii + σpi) +
1
2
U(pii − σpi)] = U [CEi], i = 1, 2, (2)
where pi1 = E(pi) and pi2 = 0. The two equations were solved numerically in order to
specify the parameters γ1 and γ2 of the utility function U . The results are presented
in Table 3.
γ1 γ2 θ(pi = 0) θ(pi = pi
′) ρ(pi = 0) ρ(pi = pi′)
0.002476680 0.000381477 0.5 0.25 0.00214612 0.00080626
Table 3: Parameters and Risk Attitudes
2.2 Simulation
Based on the data presented in Tables 1 - 3 we simulated for each of the eleven
pairs of µF and σF (Table 2) 30000 wheat yields per hectare. The high number
of drawings ensured that the mean and standard deviation of the simulated values
settled on the prespecified values. The obtained results allowed us to calculate
the associated profits per hectare and the corresponding utility. We assumed that
producers maximize their expected utility derived from the profits of agricultural
production. The farmers choice variable is µF , i.e. the intensity of production.
Higher expected yields, however, are only obtained at the cost of high risk, i.e., an
increase in σF .
To evaluate the impact of direct payments on the production intensity we added
500, 1000, 2000 and 5000 Swiss Francs to the farm profits per hectare. The altered
values of the farm profits per hectare translate into different values of utility, and
therefore the maximization of the expected utility may lead to the choice of a dif-
ferent production intensity. The outcome of these calculations is presented in Table
4.
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Direct Optimal Farm profits Farm profits plus
payment intensity (∗) direct payments
0 67.217 dt (0%) 1820.19 1820.19
500 69.717 dt (3.7%) 1820.19 + 74.91 = 1895.10 1895.10 + 500.00 = 2395.10
1000 69.717 dt (3.7%) 1820.19 + 74.91 = 1895.10 1895.10 + 1000.00 = 2895.10
1500 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 1500.00 = 3413.23
2000 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 2000.00 = 3913.23
5000 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 5000.00 = 6913.23
(∗) The values in brackets indicate the increase in production in percent as a result of
direct payments.
Table 4: Optimal Intensity as a Function of Direct Payments
The results show that direct payments, as they are in place in Switzerland, en-
hances the optimal production intensity of a risk-averse producer by the magnitude
of approximately 4,25%. However, the intensity effect decrease as direct payments
increase. The first 500 Swiss Francs leads to an increase in production that increases
profits beyond the amount of the direct payment by 74.91 CHF (distortion effect).
Thereafter, the distortion effect is decreasing with an increase in direct payments to
18.13 CHF (74.91 + 18.13 = 93.04) and then to 0 CHF. In accordance with the defi-
nition used by Hennessy (1998), the Swiss direct payment scheme can be considered
as decoupled since the governmental price support does not depend on the farm-
ers’ output. Yet, they are linked stochastically. A comparison of our results with
those of Hennessy, obtained for corn production in Iowa, confirms the production
intensification effect of decoupled direct payment, and shows that this effect is even
stronger for the case of wheat production in Switzerland, i.e. 4.8% versus 2.75% .
3 Tax Reductions on Farm Profits
A well established result in the theory of the firm is that a change in a proportional
rate of profit taxation will have no effect on the level of output. In line with this
result one could think of green tax reductions τ on farm profits in exchange for the
provision of environmental public goods or the production of positive externalities.
However, Sandmo (1971) has shown that this result does not hold in the presence
of uncertainty and the level of output varies with a change in the tax rate. For
the case where the farm can always compensate losses of one activity with gains of
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another activity such that it never experience a loss (full loss offset), Sandmo (1971)
demonstrated that an increase in the tax rate will increase, leave constant or reduce
output according as relative risk aversion is increasing, constant, or decreasing.
While the theoretical results of the effect of direct payments or tax reductions on
the level of output are interesting, they do not allow to estimate the magnitude of
this effect. In particular they do not allow comparing the effect of these two policies.
For this purpose we complement our empirical study by calculating the change in
output as a result of a reduction in the tax rate. However, we do not consider the
limited case of full loss offset considered by Sandmo (1971), since this situation is
not typical for agricultural firms. However, we distinguish between two situations,
In the first case (partial loss offset) farmers receive a subsidy that compensates in
part for their losses. Hence, they may experience profit losses. The amount of
the subsidy corresponds to the product −piτ , for pi < 0. In the second case (no
loss offset) farmers receive tax reductions only for the case where farm profits are
positive. In order to compare direct payments and tax rate reductions the latter one
was chosen such that it equals a direct payment of 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 5000
CHF. For instance a direct payment of 500 CHF requires a tax reduction of 0.275
of the average farm profits obtained with no government support (1820.19 CHF).
The tax reductions corresponding to the direct payments of 1000, 1500, 2000 and
5000 were calculated likewise and are presented in Tables 5 (partial loss offset) and
6 (no loss offset). The results show that tax reductions, in contrary to the first
intuition, are equally distorting than direct payments. Yet, tax reductions with loss
offset are more costly to the government than pure direct payment. For example
tax reductions, “equivalent” to direct payments of 500 CHF, lead to government
spending of 521.10 CHF. For the case of tax reductions without loss offset we observe
however, that they are less distorting than direct payments or tax reductions with
loss offset. For the most realistic case of tax reductions equivalent to direct payments
of 500 CHF, the distortion effect is even zero if losses are not offset. However, tax
reductions without loss offset increases government spending by 0 - 4 % compared
to pure direct payments. For the case of tax reductions with loss offset this increase
is between 4 - 5 %.
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Tax rate Optimal Farm profits Farm profits plus
reduction intensity (∗) tax reductions
0.000 67.217 dt (0%) 1820.19 1820.19
0.275 69.717 dt (3.7%) 1820.19 + 74.91 = 1895.10 1895.10 + 521.10 = 2416.15
0.550 69.717 dt (3.7%) 1820.19 + 74.91 = 1895.10 1895.10 + 1042.10 = 2937.20
0.825 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 1578.10 = 3491.33
1.099 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 2104.14 = 4017.37
2.749 70.446 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 93.04 = 1913.23 1913.23 + 5260.36 = 7173.59
(∗) The values in brackets indicate the increase of the production in percent as a re-
sult of tax reductions.
Table 5: Optimal Intensity as a Function of Tax Reductions with Partial Loss Offset
Tax rate Optimal Farm profits Farm profits plus
reduction intensity (∗) tax reductions
0.000 67.217 dt (0%) 1820.19 1820.19
0.275 67.217 dt (0%) 1820.19 + 0.00 = 1820.19 1820.19 + 500.00 = 2320.19
0.550 68.517 dt (2.1%) 1820.19 + 41.37 = 1861.56 1861.56 + 1023.65 = 2885.21
0.825 68.517 dt (2.1%) 1820.19 + 41.37 = 1861.56 1861.56 + 1535.50 = 3397.06
1.099 68.517 dt (2.1%) 1820.19 + 41.37 = 1861.56 1861.56 + 2047.31 = 3908.87
2.749 69.717 dt (4.8%) 1820.19 + 74.91 = 1895.10 1895.10 + 5210.50 = 7105.60
(∗) The values in brackets indicate the increase of the production in percent as a result of
tax reductions.
Table 6: Optimal Intensity as a Function of Tax Reductions with No Loss Offset
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of agricultural producers in the presence
of direct payments and uncertainty. For the case of Switzerland, it empirically
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confirms previous results that even decoupled direct payments intensify agricultural
production in the context of a stochastic environment. The intensification effect
in Switzerland is even stronger than for the previously analyzed case of Iowa, the
magnitude of the overall effect is not large but definitely not negligible. Additionally,
we suggest tax reductions as an alternative means of income support or income
stabilization in exchange for the provision of environmental public goods. However,
only for the case of no loss offset tax reductions lead to a notable reduction in the
distortion of production decisions. Tax reductions can be designed in line with the
general tax system. For instance, in many countries, tax reductions are offered for
families with children. One can think along this line of our proposal of tax reductions
for the provision of public goods or the provision of positive externalities.
The previous results are obtained in the context of a single product or activity
but do not necessarily hold for the case of a multi-product/activity environment
under uncertainty. Determining the production effects within this setting, requires
an empirical analysis and is seen as a promising area for future research.
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